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SITUATION III 
ARMED MERCHANT VESSELS 
States X and Y are at war. Other states are neutral. 
Some of the merchant vessels of states X and Y are armed 
and some are unarmed. 
State A admits armed merchant vessels to its ports on 
the same terms as other merchant vessels. 
State. B excludes all ar1ned merchant vessels from its 
ports. 
State C ad1nits armed merchant vessels to its ports 
under the same rules as vessels of war and admits un-
arn1ed merchant vessels as in the t-ime of peace. 
State X protests against the regulations of states A 
and C. 
State Y protests against the regulations of states B 
and C. 
How far are the protests valid~ 
SOLUTION 
Practice and opinion since 1914 afford so1ne support for 
the position of each neutral and for the protest of each 
belligerent, but the position of state C seems to be gaining 
support. The whole situation shows the need of clear 
determination of the status of armed merchant vessels. 
NOTES 
General.-During and since the World \V ar the status 
of armed merchant vessels has been a subject of much 
difference of opinion. It has been referred to in many 
diplomatic notes and in proclamations. There were 
armed merchant vessels in early times. The prevalence 
of piracy and the. use of privateers made arming seem 
necessary for safety. Slave trading was made pira'cy by 
a British act of Parliarnent in 1825. Smuggling caused 
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many complications at about this period and earlier. In 
some ren1ote coasts there was little protection for vessels 
other than such force as they might themselves muster. 
The reasons for arming were mainly for self-protection 
in time of peace and in time of war before privateering 
vvas declared abolished in 1856. 
Early polioy of the United' StaJtes.-In 1797 President 
Adams said he enter'tained no doubt-
of the policy and propriety of permitting our vessels to employ 
Ineans of defense while engaged in a lawful foreign commerce. It 
ren1ains for Congress to prescribe such regulations as will enable 
our seafaring citizens to defend themselves against violations of 
the law of nations, and at the san1e time restrain them from 
committing acts of hostility against the powers at war. 
An act of June 25, 1798 (1 Stat. L. 572), provided that 
an A1nerican merchant vessel " may oppose and defend 
itself against any search, restraint, or seizure which shall 
be attempted upon such vessel." 
Later legislation provided that: , 
The Conuuander and crew of any Inerchant vessel of the United 
States, owned wholly, or in part, by a citizen thereof, 1nay oppose 
and defend against any aggression, search, restraint, depredation, 
or seizure, which shall be attempted upon such vessel, or upon 
any other vessel so owned, by the commander or crew of any 
anned vessel whatsoever, not being a public armed vessel of smne 
nation in amity with the United States, and may subdue and cap-
ture the san1e; and n1ay also retake any vessel so owned which 
may have been captured by the commander or crew of any such 
anned vessel, and send the san1e into any port of the United 
States. (Act Mar. 3, 1819, 3 Stat. p. 513, temporary act till next 
session of Congress; made pennanent by act Jan. 30, 1823, 3 
Stat. p. 721.) 
Declaration of Paris, 1856.-The Declaration of Paris, 
1856, provided "Privateering is and remains abolished" 
with the idea that privately armed vessels would no 
longer be used in war. Subsidized vessels, volunteer 
fleets, etc., were at first regarded with suspicion but later 
were generally accepted. 
/ 
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Attit~tde of United States, late nineteenth, centuJ·y.--
After the Declaration of Paris, 1856, the United States 
.. was particularly careful to explain that the laws did noL 
forbid arming " solely for the purpose of defense an< L 
self-protection." There was, however, 1nuch concern 
.test vessels should be armed in the United States ancl 
. .subsequQntly engage in filibustering expeditions, and 
armed vessels -vvere r'equired to give bonds to double 
their value in order to discourage such activities, show-
Ing that arming was not regarded as essential to safety 
of the vessel. The attitude of other states had bePn 
somewhat similar in regard to arming. 
Pre-tdar British attit~tde.-ln his speech upon the 
naval estimate on Wednesday, March 26, 1913, Mr. 
Churchill after speaking more particularly of the r ma-
terial of the Navy and of protection against airships 
said: 
I turn to one aspect of trade protection which requires special 
reference. It was made cle·ar at the Second I-Iague Conferenee 
that certain of the Great Powers have reserved to themselves 
the right to convert merchant stea1ners h1to cruisers, not 1nerely 
in national harbours, but if necessary on the high seas. There 
is now good reason to believe that a considerable number of 
foreign merchant steamers may be rapidly converted into armed 
ships by the mounting of guns. The sea-borne trade of' the world 
follows well-marked routes, upon nearly all of which the tonnage 
of the British Mercantile lVIarine largely predo1ninates. Our food-
carrying liners and vessels carrying raw material following 
these trade routes would, in certain contingencies, meet foreign 
vessels armed and equipped in the 1nanner described. If the 
British ships had no armament, they would be at the mercy 
of any foreign liners carrying one effective gun and a few rounds 
of ammunition. It would be obviously absurd to meet the con-
tingency of considerable numbers of foreign armed merchant 
cruisers on ~he high seas by building an equal nu1nber of cruisers. 
That would expose this country to an expenditure of money to 
meet a particular danger altogether di.sproportiona te to the 
expense caused to any foreign Power in creating tbat danger. 
Hostile cruisers, wherever they are found, will be covered and 
met by British ships of war, but the proper reply to an aqned 
merchantman is another merchantman armed in her own defence. 
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'l'his is the position to which the Admiralty have felt it neces-
sar;v to draw the attention of leading shipowners. We have 
felt justified in pointing out to them the danger to life and 
property which would be incurred if their vessels were totally 
incapable of offering any defense to an attack. The shipowners 
have responded to the Admiralty invitation with cordiality, and 
substantial progress has been 1nade in the direction of meeting 
it by preparing as a defensive 1neasure to equip a number of 
first-class British liners to repel the attack of armed foreign 
n1erchant cruisers. Although these vessels have, of course, a 
wholly different status frOin that of the regularly cOinmissioned 
Inerchant cruisers, such as those we obtain under the Cunard 
agreement. the Admiralty have felt that the greater part of the 
cost of the necessary equipn1ent should not fall upon the owners, 
and we have decided, therefore, to lend the necessary· guns, to 
supply annuunition, and to provide for the training of 1nembers 
of the ship's con1pany to for1n the guns' crews. The owners 
on their part are paying the cost of the necessary . structural 
conversion. which is not great. · The British :Mercantile Marine 
will, of course, have the protection of the Royal Navy under 
all possible circun1stances, but it is 9bviously impossible to 
guarantee individual vessels from attack when they are scattered 
on their voyages all over the world. No one can pretend to 
view these n1easures ·without regret, or without hoping that the 
period of retrogression all over the world which has rendered them 
necessary Inay be succeeded by days of broader international confi-
dence and agree1nent than those through which we are now pass-
ing. (Parliainentary Debates, Commons [1913], vol. 50, p. 1776.) 
On June 10, 1913, Mr. Churchill (First Lord o£ the 
Achnira.lty) said : 
The House will perhaps allow me to take the opportunity of 
clearing up a misconception which appears to be prevalent. 
1\'Ierchant vessels carrying guns may belong to one or other of two 
totally different classes. The first class is that of anned mer-
chant cruisers which on the outbreak of war would be com-
nlissionecl under the 'Vhite Ensign and would then be indis-
tinguishable in statu~ and control from men-of-war. In this 
class belong the M au1retania and Lusitanl.a. The second class 
consists of n1erchant vessels, which would (unless specially taken 
up by the Achniralty for any purpose) remain merchant vessels 
in war, without any change of status, but have been equipped 
by their owners, with Ad1niralty assistance, with a defensive 
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.armament in order to exercise their right of beating off a ttack. 
(Parliamentary Debates, Commons [1913], vol. 53, p. 1431. ) 
On June 11, 1913, in reply to a question as to whether 
m~rchant ships ·were " equipped for defense only and not 
for attack," Mr. Churchill said: 
Surely these ships will be quite valueless for the purposes of 
attacking anned vessels of any kind. What they are serviceable 
for is to defend themselves against the attack of o~her vessels of 
their own standing. (Parlian1entary Debates, Conunons, 1913, 
Vol. 53, p. 1599.) 
Again on ~larch 17, 1914, Mr. Churchill, speaking for 
the British Government, said of armed 1nerchant ships: 
* * * by the end of 1914-15 seventy ships will have been so 
(two 4.7 guns) armed. They are anned solely for defensive 
purposes. The guns are mounted in the stern and can only fire 
on a pursuer. * * * They are not allowed to fight \VLh any 
ships of war. * * * They are, however, thoroughly capable of 
self-de.fense against an enemy's armed n1erchantman. (Parlia-
Inentary Debates, Commons, 1914, vol. 59, 1925.) 
Late Ger1nan attitude.-The counselor of the Ger1nan 
Imperial Navy Department, Dr. George Schran1, said in 
1913: 
Self -defense is defined as a defense against any unla '\Yful en-
croachment upon a legal right. (Das Prisenrecht, p. 308.) 
It is doubtful in particular cases in what the criterion of 
forcible resistance consis~s, especially whether preparations, e. g.: 
equipment of the vessel with suitable arma1nent, would entail 
the legal consequences of resistance. This question 111 ust be an-
swered in the negative. Preparations or the ·n1ere atte1npt to 
escape do no~ constitute in the1nselves a forcible defense; they 
do not encroach upon the legal rights of the belligerent. (Ibid. 
p. 310.) 
E arrly British motes on etrr?ned rnerchant vessels ·in 
World lV ar.-Great Britain declared war against Ger-
many on August 4, 1914. On the same day the British 
charge in Washington sent to the Secretary of State a 
comn1unication in. regard to the arming of merchant ves-
sels in neutral waters, and other notes follo,ved. 
' 
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The British Gha1"'ge to the Secretary of State 
(No. 252.) BRITISH EMBASSY, 
1Vashi.n,gton, AU.fJUS't 1,, 1911,. 
SrR: In view of the state· of war now existing between Great 
Britain and Ge-rmany, I have the honour, under instructions from 
His :Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, t<T 
make the following communication to you in respe·ct to the arming 
of any merchant vessels in neutral wate·rs. 
As you are• aware it is recognized that a neutral Governrnent is 
bound to use due diligence~ to prohibit its subje·cts or citizens front 
the building and fitting out to order of belligerent vessels intended 
for warlike purposes and also to prevent the departure of any · 
such vessels from its jurisd:ction. The starting point for the uni-
versal recognition of this principle was the thr ee r ules formulated 
in Article VI of the Treaty between Great Britain and the United 
States of America for the amicable settlement of all causes of 
differences betwe3n the two countries, signed at 'Vashington on 
l\1ay 8, 1871. These r ules, which His :Majesty's Governrnent and 
the United States Government agreed to observe as between thern-
. " 
selves iJ?- future, are as follows: 
"A neutral Government is bound-
" First. To use due· diligence· to prevent the fitting out, arming, 
or equipping, within its jurisdiction/ of any vessel which it has 
reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on 
war aga 1nst a Power with which it is at peace; and also to use 
like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of 
any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such 
vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within 
such jurisdiction to warlike use. 
" Secondly. Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make 
use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against 
the other, or for. the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of 
milita,ry supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men. 
" Thirdly. To exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, 
and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any 
violation of the foregoing obligations and duties." 
The above rules may be said to have acquired the force of gen-
erally recognized rules of International Law, and the first of 
them is reproduced almost textually, in Article VIII of The 
Hague Convention Number 13 of 1907 concerning the Rights and, 
Duties of Neutral Powers in case of Maritime 'Varfare, the 
principles of which have been agreed to by practically every 
maritime State·. 
It is known, however, that Germany, with whmn Great Britain 
is at war, favours the policy of converting her merchant vessels 
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into armed ships on the High Seas, and it is probable, there-
fore, that attempts will be made to e·quip and despatch mer-
chantmen for such conversion from the ports of the United States. 
It is probable that, even if the final completion of the measures 
to fit out merchantmen to act as cruisers. may have· to be effected 
on the High Seas, most of the preliminary arrangements will 
have been made before· the vessels leave port, so that the warlike 
purpose to which they are to be put after leaving neutral waters 
1nust be more or less manifest before their departure. 
In calling your attention to the above 1ncntloned. "Rules of 
the Treaty of vVashington" and The I--Iague Convention, I have 
the honour to state that His Majesty's Govern1nent will accord-
ingly hold the United States Govern1nent responsible for any 
damages to British Trade or shipping, or injury to British inter-
ests generally, which may be caused by such vessels having been 
equipped at, or departing fron1, United States ports. 
I have, etc., 
CoLVILLE BARCLAY. 
(Spec. Sup. A1n. Jour. Int. Law, vol. 9, July, 1915, p. 222.) 
The British Charge d'Affaires to the Secretary of State 
(No. 259.) BRITISH EMBASSY, 
lVashington, August 9, 1914. 
SrR : With reference to 1ny note No. 252 of the 4th instant, I 
have the honour to inform you that I have no'v receive cl instruc-
tions from Sir Edward Grey to 1nake a further communication to 
you in explanation of the position taken by His Majesty's Gov-
ernment in regard to the question of anned merchantlnen. 
As you are no doubt aware, a certain nun1ber of British 
1nerchant vessels are armed, but this is a precautionary 1neasure 
adopted solely for the purpose of' defence, which. under existing 
rules of international law, is the right of all 1nerchant vessels 
when attacked. 
According to British rule, British merchant vessels can not be 
converted into men-of-war in any foreign port, for the reason 
that Great Britain does not adn1it the right of any Powel' to 
do this on the High Seas. The duty of a neutral to intern or 
order the immediate departure of belligerent vessels is limitecl 
to actual and potential men-of-war, and in the opinion of IIis 
Majesty's Governme~t, there can therefore be no right on the 
part of neutral Governments to intern British armed Inei·chant 
vessels, which can not be converteu into 1nen-of-war on the 
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High Seas, nor to require them to land their guns before 
proceeding to sea. 
On the other hand, the German Government have consistently 
clain1ed the right of conversion on the High Seas, and His 
:Majesty's Government therefore 1naintain their claim that ves-
sels which are adapted for conversion and· under German rules 
n1ay be converted into men-of-war on the High Seas should be 
interned in the absence of binding assurances, the responsibility 
for which must be assumed by the neutral Government concerned, 
that they shall not be so converted. 
I have, etc., 
COLVILLID BARCLAy. 
(Ibid. p. 223.) 
THE BRITISH CHARGE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE· 
BRITISH EMBASSY, 
Wa·shiJngton, A'll~gust 12, 1914. 
SIR : With reference to 1ny notes Nos. 252 and 259 of August 4 
and August 9, respectively, stating and explaining the position 
taken up by His Majesty's Government in regard to the question 
of armed merchantmen, I have the honor to state that I have now 
been infonned by Sir Edward Grey that exactly similar instruc-
tions were at the same thne issued by him to His Majesty's 
representatives in practically all neutral countries to address the 
san1e com1nunications to the respective Governn1ents to which they 
were accredited. 
COLVILLE BARCLAY. 
(Ibid. p. 224.) 
Reply of th1e United StaJtes.-The United States in a 
note of August 19, 1914, reviewed briefly the British 
notes and showed that France and Russia had upheld the 
right of conversion on the high seas as 'vell as Austria 
and Germany, while Great Britain and Belgium had 
opposed this right at The Hague Conference in 1907. 
Great Britain had later 1naintained that there was no 
rule of international law on the subject. Referring to 
the last clause of the British ·note of August 4, 1914, in 
·which the responsibility of the United States ·was 
declared, the American note said : 
It see1ns obvious therefore that by neither the terms · nor the 
interpretation of the provisions of the treaties on this point is th~ 
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United States bound to assu1ne the attitude of an insurer. Con-
sequently the United States disclaims as a correct statement of 
its responsibility the assertion in your note that " His l\1aj.esty's 
Govern1nent will accordingly hold the United States Govern1nent 
responsible for any dmnages to British trade or shipping, or injury 
to British interests generally, which may be caused by such ves-
sels having been equipped at, or departing from, United States 
ports." (Ibid. p. 228.) 
BTitislt asstl?"aJnces, 191,4.-Sir Cecil Spr{ng-Rice wrote 
to the Secretary o£ State, August 25, 1914: 
( N 0. 289.) BRITISH EMBASSY, 
1Vashington, A,ugust 25, 1914. 
'Vith reference to Mr. Barclay's notes Nos. 2.52 and 259 of the 
4th and 9th of August. respectively, fully explaining the position 
taken up by His Majesty's Government in regard to the question 
of armed merchanti~en . I have the honour, in view of the fact that 
a number of British anned 1nerchantmen will now be visiting 
United States ports, to reiterate that the anning of British mer-
chantmen is solely a precautionary measure adopted for the pur-
pose of defen~e against attack frmn hostile craft. 
I have at the .sa1ne time be~m instructed by His l\fajesty's Prin-
cipal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to give· the United 
States Government the fullest assurances that British n1erchant 
vessels will never be used for purposes of attack, that they are 
merely peaceful traders armed only for defence, that they will 
never fire unless first fired upon, and that they will never under 
any circumstances attack any vessel. (Ibid., p. 230.) 
To this the State Department replied as follo\vs: 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
Wash.ingto,n, August 29, 1914. 
I have the honor to ackno,vledge the receipt of your note· of the 
25th instant in which, referring to previous correspondence·, you 
state that, in view of the· fact that a number of British armed 
merchantmen will now be visiting United States ports, you desire 
to reite·rate· that the arming of British me·rchantmen is solely · a 
precnutionary me·asure· adopted for the· purpose of defence against 
attack from hostile craft. Yon add that you have been instructed 
by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State· for Fore-ign Affairs 
to give the Government of the United States the fullest assur-
ances that British merchant vessels will never be used for pur-
poses of attack, that the,y are· merely p;eaceful traders armed only 
for rlefence, that they will never fire, unless first fired upon, and 
I 
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that they will never under any circumstances attack any vessel. 
(Ibid. p. 230.) 
The Ad~t~c, armed with four guns, and the M errion, 
armed with six guns, had entered. ports of the United 
States and the American Government foresaw complica-
tions in maintaining neutrality and so notified British 
authorities. The British ambassador states on September 
4, 1914: 
I have now received a reply from Sir Edward Grey, in which 
he informs me that IIis 1\Iajesty's Government hold the view that 
it is not in accordance with neutrality and inteTnational law to 
detain in neutral ports. 1nerchant vessels ar1ned with purely de-
fensive armaments. But in view of the fact that the· United 
States Governn1ent is detaining arn1ed merchant vessels prepared 
for offensive warfare, and in order to avoid the difficult questions 
of the character and degree of armament which would justify 
detention, His l\tlajesty's Government have made arrangements 
for landing the guns of the JJ!I e~rrion, the· Ad.ria.tio having already 
sailed before the orders re·ached her. In the case of the· latter 
ship, the passenger list and cargo had 'proved that she was pro-
ceeding to sea on ordinary comn1ereial businesf:l. These and other 
papers relative to the case will be duly cmnmunicated to your 
Department. 
This action has been taken without prejudice to the· gen·eral 
principle which His l\1ajesty's Government have enunciated and to 
which they adhere. (Ibid. p. 231.) 
The British position vvas further set forth In Inemo-
randa. of September 9, 1914: 
A merchant vessel armed purely for self-defence· is therefore 
entitled under international law to enjoy the· status of a peace-
ful trading ship in neutral ports and His Majesty's Governn1ent 
do not ask for better treatment for British n1erehant ships in 
this respect than n1igh t be accorded to those of other Powers. 
They consider that only those merchant ships which are intended 
for use as cruisers should be treated as ships of war and that 
the questions whether a particular ship carrying an ar1nament 
is intended for offensive or defensive action 1nust be decided by 
the simple criterion whether she· is engaged in ordinary com-
merce and embarking cargo and passengers in the ordinary way. 
If so, there is no rule in international law that would justify 
such vessel even if armed being treated otherwise than as a 
peaceful trader. 
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In urging this. view upon the consideration of the United States 
·Government the' British Ambassador is instructed to state· that it 
is be1ieved that Gennan n1erchant vessels. with offensive annament 
have escaped from A1nerican ports, especially fron1 ports in South 
America to prey upon British c01nmerce in spite· of all the pre-
cautions taken. German cruisers in the· Atlantic continue· by one 
n1eans or another to obtain ample! supplies of coal shipped to them 
fron1 neutral ports, and if the United States Government take· the 
view that British merchant vessels which are bona fide· engaged 
in com1nerce and carry guns at the stern only are not pennitted 
purely defensive arma1nent, unavoidable injury may ensue to 
British interests and indirectly also· to United States trade which 
will be deplorable. (Ibid. p. 233.) 
M em.ora1ndwn~ of S'tat e D'eparrt1ne11:.t, Septe·1nber 19, 
191.1;.-The attitude o:f. the Department of State Yvas 
made kno·wn in a memorandum aimed to set forth physi-
cal bases for determination of the intent of arnnng mer-
chant vessels. 
THE STATUS OF ARMED MERCHANT VE:SSELS 
A 
A n1erchant vessel of belligerent nationality 1nay carTy an anna-
ment and ammunition for the sole purpose of defense without 
acquiring the characte·r of a ship of w.ar. 
B 
'.rhe presence of an arn1ament and ammunition on board a mer-
chant vessel creates a presumption that the ar1na1nent is for 
offensive purposes, but the owners or agents may overcome this 
presumption by evidence showing that the vessel carries ar1na-
ment sole~y for defense. 
c 
Evidence necessary to establish the fact that the arma1nent is 
solely for defense and will not be· used offensively, whether the 
arma1nent be· mounted or stowed below, must be presented in each 
case independently at an official investigation. The result of the 
investigation 1nust show conclusively that the ar1na1nent is not 
intended for, .and will not be used in, offensive operations. 
Indications that the armament will not be used offensively are: 
1. That the caliber of the guns carried does not exceed six 
inches. 
2. That the guns and small arms carried are few h1 number . 
l 
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3. That no guns are mounted on the forward part of the vessel. 
4. That the quantity of an1munition carried is small. 
5. That the vessel is manned by its usual crew, and the officers 
are the same as those on board before war was declared. 
6. That the vessel intends to and actually does. clear for a port 
lying in its usual trade route, or a port indicating its purpose to 
continue in the same trade in which it was engaged before war 
was declared. 
7. That the vessel takes on board fuel and supplies sufficient 
only to carry it to its port of destination, or the same quantity 
substantially which it has been accustomed to take for a voyage 
before· war was declared. t 
8. That the ca rgo of the· vessel consists of articles of commerce 
unsuited for the use of a ship of war in operations . against an 
enemy. 
9. That the· vess2l carries passengers who are as a \vhole un-
fitted to enter the military or naval service of the belligerent 
whose flag the vessel flies, or of any of its allies, and particularly 
if the passenger list included women and children. 
10. That the spee d of the ship is slow. 
D 
Port authorities, on the arrival in a port of the United States of 
an armed vessel of belligerent nationality, clain1ing to be a mer-
c,hant vessel, should ilnmediately investig.ate and report to ""\Vash-
ington on the foregoing indications as to the· intended use of the 
anntunent, in order that it may be· determined whether the evi-
dence is sufficient to remove the presumption that the· vessel is, 
and should be treated as, a ship of war. Clearance will not be 
granted until authorized from "'\Vashington, and the master will 
be so informed upon arrival. 
E 
The conversion of a 1nerchant vessel into a ship of war is a 
question of fact which is to be established by direct or circum-
stantial e·vidence· of intention to use· the vessel as a ship of war. 
(Ibid. p. 234.) 
Gern1an a.ttitttde.-Mr. G~rard transmitted a note from 
the Gern1an foreign office on October 15 'vhich referred 
to the n1emorandum o:f September 19, 1914. This note 
says: 
It is a question whether or not ships thus armed should be 
ad1nitted into ports of a neutral country at all. Such ships! 
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in any event, should not receive any better treatment in neutral 
ports than a regular warship, and should be subject as least to the 
rules issued by neutral nations restricting the stay of a warship. 
If the GoYernment of the United States considers that it fulfills 
its duty as a neutral nation by confining th·e ad1nission of anned 
merchant ships to such ships as are equipped for defensive 
purposes only, it is pointed out that so far as determining the war-
like character of a ship is concerned, the distinction between 
the defensive and offensive is irrelevant. The destination of a 
ship for use of any kind in war is conclusive, and restrictions 
as to the extent of annament afford no guarantee that ships armed 
for defensive purposes only will not be used for offensive purposes 
under certain circumstances. (Ibid. p. 238.) 
On November 7 the United States expressed its dissent 
from the German point. of view, reaffirmed the princi-
ples of the memorandum of September 19 and expressed 
"disapprobation of a practice which compelled it to pass 
upon a vessel's intended use " and further stated : 
As a result of these representations no merchant vessel with 
armaments have visited the ports of the United States. since the 
10th of September. In fact fr01n the beginning of the European. 
war but two anned private vessels have entered or cleared from 
ports of this country and as to these vessels their character as 
merchant vessels was conclusively established. 
Please bring the foregoing to the attention of the German 
Government and in doing . so express the hope that they will also 
prevent their 1nerchant vessels from entering the ports of the 
United States carrying annaments even for defensive purposes 
though they may possess the right to do so by the rules of inter-
national law. (Ibid. p. 239.) 
Pr'oposaZs of Department of St(JJte,, J am;ua!NJ 18, 1916.-
The treatment of armed merchant vessels became a 
matter of discussion in Congress and elsewhere, and fur-
ther correspondence. In an informal and confidential 
letter the Department of State made certain propositions, 
as follows: 
In order to bring submarine warfare within the general rules 
of international law. and the principle·s~ of humanity without 
destroying its efficiency in the destruction of commerce, I believe 
that a formula may be found which, though it may require slight 
modifications of the practice generally followed by nations prior 
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to the employment of submarines, will appeal to· the sense o:i 
justice and fairness of a ll the belligerents in the present war. 
Your excellency will understand that in seeking a formula or 
rule of this nature I approach it of necess<ity from the· point of 
vievY of a neutral, but I belie·ve that it will be equally efficacious 
in preservjng the lives of all noncombatants on merchant' vessels 
of belligerent nationality. 
l\'Iy coininents on this subject .are predicated on the following 
propositions : 
1. A noncombatant has a right to traverse the high seas in 
a merchant vess.el entitled to fly a belligerent flag and to rely 
upon the observance of the rules of international law and prin-
ciples of humanity if the vessel is approached by a naval vessel 
of another belligerent. 
2. A merchant vessel of enemy nationality should not be 
attacked without being ordered to stop. 
3. An ene·my merchant vessel when ordered to do so by a 
belligerent submarine, should immediately stop. 
4. Such vessel should not be attacked after being ordered to 
stop unless it attempts to flee or to resist, and in case it ceases 
to flee or resist, the attack should discontinue·. 
5. In the event that it is impossible to place a prize crew 
. on board of an enemy merchant vessel or convoy it into port, the 
vessel 1nay be sunk, provided the crew and passengers have been 
removed to a place of safety. 
In complying with the foregoing propositions which, in my 
opinion, e1nbody the principal rules, the strict observance of 
which will insure the life of a noncombatant on a merchant 
vessel which is intercepted by a submarine, I am not unmindful 
of the obstacles which would be met by undersea craft as 
commerce destroyers. 
Prior to the year 1915 belligerent operations against enemy 
c01nmerce on the high seas had been conducted with cruisers 
carrying heavy armaments. Under those conditions international 
law appeared to permit a merchant vessel to carry an annament 
for defensive purposes without losing its character as a private 
commercial vessel. This right seems to have been predicated on 
the superior defensive strength of ships of' war, and the limitation 
of armament to have been dependent on the fact that it could not 
be used effectively in offense against enemy naval vessels, while it 
could defend the merchantmen against the generally inferior 
armament of piratical ships and privateers. 
The use of the submarine, however, has changed these rela-
tions. Comparison of the defensive strength of a cruiser and a 
submarine sho,vs that the latter, relying for protection on its 
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power to submerge, is almost defenseless in point of construc-
tion. Even a merchant ship carrying a small caliber gun would 
be able to use it effectively for offense against a submarine. 
Moreover, pirates and sea rovers have been swept from the main 
trade channels of the sea8, and privateering has been abolished. 
Consequently, the placing of guns on me-rchantlnen at the present 
day of submarine warfare can be explained only on the ground 
of a purpose to render merchantmen superior in force to sub-
marines and to prevent warning and visit and search by them. 
Any arma1nent, therefore, on a merchant vessel would see1n to 
have the character of an offensive armament. 
If a sub1narine is required to stop and search a 1nerchant 
vessel on the high seas and, in case it is found that she is of 
enemy character and that conditions necessitate her destruc-
tion, to remove to a place of safety all persons on board, it 
would not seem just or reasonable that the submarine should be 
compelled, while complying with these requirements, to expose 
itself to almost certain destruction by the guns on board the 
merchant vessel. 
It would, therefore, appear to be a reasonable and reciprocally 
just arrangement if it could be agreed by the opposing belligerents 
that submarines should be caused to adhere strictly to the rules 
of international law in the matter of stopping and searching 
merchant vessels, determining their belligerent nationality, and 
re1noving the crews and passengers to places of safety before 
sinking the vessels as prizes of war, and that merchant vessels 
of belligerent nationality should be prohibited and prevented from 
carrying any armament whatsoever. 
In presenting this formula as a basis for conditional declara-
tions by the belligerent Governments, I do so in the full con-
viction that your Government will consider primarily the humane 
purpose of saving the lives of innocent people rather than the 
insistence upon a doubtful legal right which may be denied on 
account of new conditions. (Spec. Sup. Am. Jour. Int. Law, vol. 
10, Oct. 1916, p. 310.) 
Replies.-A German note of February 10, 1916, with its 
numerous exhibits aimed to support the conclusion that 
under the circumstances of the existing hostilities "enemy 
mercha~t1nen armed ·with guns no longer have any right 
to be considered as peaceable vessels of commerce." 
On March 23, 1916, after consulting the allied Qov-
ernments the British Government communicated its views 
on the letter of January 18, 1916, in a memorandum. 
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This 1nen1orandum gave little attention to the proposi-
tions of the Secretary of State but enumerated cases in 
·which it was c~aimed the enemy has disregarded the law. 
The memorandum did say, ho·wever: 
Upon peru~al of the personal letter addressed under date of 
January 18th last, by the Honorable Secretary of State of the 
United States to the Ambassador of England at Washington, 
the Governn1ent of His Britannic Majesty could not but appre-
ciate the lofty sentiments by which IVIr. Lansing was inspired 
on sub1nitting to the countries concerned certain considerations 
touching the defensive armament of merchant vessels. But the 
enemy's lack of good faith, evidenced in too many instances 
to permit of their being regarded as isolated acc:dents justifies 
the most serious doubt as to the possibility of putting into 
practice the suggestions thus formulated. 
From a strictly legal standr}oint, it must be admitted that 
the arming of merchant vessels for defense is their acknowledged 
right. It was established in. some countries by long usage, in 
other countries it was expressly sanctioned by the legislator, 
such being the case in the United States, in particular. 
It being so, it see1ns obv:ous1 that 'any request that a bellig-
erent forego lawful means of protection from the enemy's un-
lawful attacks placPs, upon him, whoever he may be, who 
formulates the proposition, the duty and responsibility of com-
pelling that enemy to desist from such attacks, for the said 
enemy would otherwise be encouraged rather to persist in that 
course. Now the suggestions above referred to do not provide 
any immediately efficacious sanction. (Spec. Sup. Am. Jour. Int. 
Law, vol. 10, Oct. 1916, p. 336.) 
And later in the sa1ne mernorandu1n Great Britain 
after imputing faithlessness to Germany as well as law-
lessness, says : 
At the end of his letter, the Honorable Secretary of State hypo-
thetically considered the possibility of eventual decisions under 
which armed merchant vessels might be treated as .auxiliary 
cruisers. 
It is His Britannic Majesty's Government's conviction that thP-
realization of such a hypothesis which would materially n1odify, 
to Germany's advantage, the· statement of views published in this 
respect by the American Government on September lH, 1914, can 
not be given practical consideration by the American authorities. 
Such a modification indeed would be inconsistent with the gen-
. I 
eral prineiples of. neutrality as sanctioned in paragraphs 5· and 6 
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of the preamble to the, 13th ' convention of The Hague concerning 
maritime neutrality. Moreover the result would be contrary to 
the stipulations, of the 7th convention of The, Hague concerning 
the transformation of merchant vessels into warships. Finally 
if armed merchant vessels were to be treated as. auxiliary cruis-
ers, the~r would possess. the' right of making prizes, and this would 
n1ean the revival of privatee·ring. (Ibid. p. 337.) 
The Secretary of State replied, diplomatically statipg 
that it becomes his dvty to accept the reply of the Entente 
Governments "as final, and in the spirit in which they 
have made it." 
Arn~e'rican memora.ndu1i~, Ma-rch 25, 191,6.-0n March 
25, 1.916, a memorandum prepared by the direction of 
the President, but unsigned, though issued by the De-
partment of State, vvas made public as a statement of the 
" Government's attitude" on the status of armed mer-
chant vessels. This memorandun1 considered the status 
of an arn1ed merchant vessel fro1n the point of vie'v of 
the "neutral V\Then the vessel enters its ports " and from 
the point of vie"r of " an ene1ny when the vessel is on the 
high seas." A1nong other state1nents in this: memoran-
dun1 are the following: 
(1) It is necessary for a neutral Goyer1unent to deterrnine, the 
status of an armed n1erchant vessel of belligerent nationality 
which enters its jurisdiction, _ in order that the Government may 
protect itself from responsibility for the_ destruction of life and 
property by pe1·mitting its ports to be us~d as bases of hostile 
operations by belligerent warships. 
( 2) If the vessel carries a conlmis.sion or orders issued by a 
belligerent Government and directing it under penalty to conduct 
aggressive operations, or if it is conclusively sho\vn to· have con-
ducted such operations, it should be regarded and treated as· a 
warship. 
( 3) If sufficient evidence is wanting, a neutral Governmen't, 
in order to safeguard itself frmn liability for failure to preserve 
it~ i1eutrality, 1nay reasonably presu1ne frcnn' the facts the sta'ttts 
of an anned merchant vessel which frequents its ,-vaters. There is 
no settled rule of internationai law as to the sufficiency 'of evi-
dence to establish such presumption. As a result a' Governn1ent 
must decide for itself t'he si1fficiency of the ·evidence which it 
requires to deterrniue the character o{ the vessel. ' ·For the guid-
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ance of its port officers and other officials a neutral Government 
111ay therefore declare a st~ndard of evidence, but such standard 
n1ay be changed on account of the general conditions of na~al .. wa_r 
fare or 1nodified on account of the circun1stances of a particular 
case. These changes and 1nodifications 1nay be made at any thne 
during the progress of the war, ~ince th~ determination of the 
status of an armed 1nerchant vessel in neutral waters 1nay affect 
the liability of a neutral Govenunent. * * * 
The status of an anned n1erchant vessel as a warship in neutral 
waters 1nay be determined, in the absence -of documentary proof or 
conclusive eyidence of previous aggressive conduct, by presumption 
derived from all the circumstances of the case. * * * 
( 1) It appears to be the established rule of international law 
that ·warships of a belligerent n1ay enter neutral ports and accept 
limited hospitality there upon condition that they leave, as a rule, 
within 24 hours after their arrival. 
(2) Belligerent warships are also entitled. to take on fuel once 
in three Inonths in ports of a neutral country. 
(3) As a n1ode of enforcing these rules a neutral has the right 
to cause belligerent warshi11s f~liling to comply with the1n, together, 
·with their officers and cr~ws, to be interned during the remainder 
of the war. 
( 4) iVIerchantmen of bPllige1·ent nationality, armed only for pur-
poses of protection against the enemy, are entitled to enter and 
leave neutral ])Oits ·without hindrance ~n .the course o~ legitimate 
trade. · · ~ · , ~ .··· - ".- ·-
( 5) Armed merchantmen of belligerent nationality under a 
commission or orders of their Government to use, under penalty, 
their annament for aggressiYe purposes, or mercbanhnen which, 
without such conunission or orders, have used their annaments 
for aggressiYe purpo~~s, are not ~ntitled to the same hospitality 
in neutral }JOrts as peaceable anned 1nerchantn1en. (Spec. Sup. 
Am. Jour. Int. Law, vol. 10, pp: 367, 369.) · 
The 1ne1norandum later refers to the status of anned 
1nerchant _vessels on the high seas, entnnerating various 
relations. The memorandtun states: 
(11) A n1erchantn1an entitlecJ to exercise the right of self-
protection n1ay do so when certain of attack by an enemy war-
ship, otherwise the exercise of the right would be so restricted 
as to render it ineffectual. Tl~ere is a distinct difference, how-
ever, between the exercise of the right of self-protection and the 
act of cruising the seas in an armed yessel for the purpose of 
attacking ene1ny naYal vessels. 
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(12) In ihe event that merchant ships of belligerent nationality 
are arn1ed and under commission or orders to attack in all cir-
cumstances certain classes of enemy naval vessels for the pur-
pos~ of ·destroying them, and are entitled to receive priz~ money 
for such service from their Government or are liable to ~ 
penalty for failure to obey the orders given, such merchant ships 
lose their status as peaceable merchant ships and are to a 
limited extent incorporated in the naval forces of their Govern-
ment, even though it is not their sole occupation to conduct hostile 
operations. 
(13) A vessel engaged intermittently in commerce and under a 
commission or orders of its Government imposing a penalty, in 
punming and attacking enemy naval craft, possesses a status 
tainted with a hostile purpose which it can now throw aside or 
assume at \Viii. It should, therefore, be considered as an armed 
public vessel and receive the treatment of a warship by an enemy 
and by neutrals. Any person taking passage on such a vessel 
can not expect ilnmunity other than that accorded persons who 
are on board a warship. A private vessel, engaged in seeking 
enemy naval craft, without such a commission or orders from 
its Government, stands in a relation to the enemy similar to 
that of a civilian who fires upon the organized 1nilitary forces of 
a belligerent, and is entitled to no more considerate treatment. 
(Ibid. p. 3'?1.) 
This n1en1orandum apparently envisages two classes 
of armed merchant vessels, namely "peaceable armed 
merchantmen" and "warlike armed merchantmen." As 
to evidence as to character an earlier paragraph had said: 
(3) A presumption based solely on the presence of an arma-
nlent on a merchant vessel of an enemy is not a sufficient reason 
for a belligerent to declare it to be a warship and proceed to 
attack it without regard to the rights of the persons on board. 
Conclusive evidence of a purpose to use the armament for ag-
gression is essential. Consequently an armament which a neutral 
Government, seeking to perform its neutral .duties, may presume 
to be intended for aggression, 1night in fact on the high seas be 
used solely for protection. A neutral Gover1unent has no oppor-
tunity to deter1nine the purpose of an armament on a merchant 
vessel unless there is evidence in the ship~s 11apers or other proof 
as to. its 11revious usc, so that the Government is justified in sub-
stituting an arbitnu:y rule of presumption in arriving at the 
status of the Inerchant ve:ssel. On the other hand, a belligerent . 
warship can on the high seas test by actual experience the 
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IJUrpose of an arman1ent on an enemy merchant vessel, and so 
determine by direct evidence the statt"s of the vessel. (Ibid. 
p. 368.) 
The application of such principles for determining 
status as those mentioned in paragraph (12) above ·would 
prove difficult if not impossible to establish, e. g., "orders 
to attack in all circumstances" would rarely be given. 
So1ne states no longer give prize money and this is not 
given for destruction of naval vessels. 
This memorandum particularly shows the need of some · 
definite and 'veil-prepared statement as to n1erchant ves-
sels in time of war. 
Professor' Hyde's opin,ion on United States 1ne1noran-
d1t1n of M axrch 135, 1916.- · 
Apart from any question respecting the applicability of the 
foregoing declaration to the special conditions confronting the 
United States in March, 1916, the author, with greatest deference 
for the opinion of those responsible for the men1orandun1, con-
fesses his inability to accept it as a state1nent of international 
law for the following reasons: 
(a.) It fails to heed the fact that the hn1nunity of merchant 
vessels from attack at sight grew out of their hnpotency to en-
danger the safety of public armed vessels of an enemy, and 
that 1naritime, States have never acquiesced in a principle that 
a 1nerchant vessel so arn1ed as to be capable of destroying a 
vessel of war of any kind should enjoy im1nunity frmn attack 
at sight, at least when encountering an enen1y cruiser of inferior 
defensive strength. 
(b) That an armed merchantman 1nay retain its status as a 
private· ship is not de·cisive of the treatment to which it may be 
subjected. The potentiality and special adaptability of the vessel 
to engage in hostile operations fraught with danger to the· safety 
of an enemy vessel of war, rather than the· designs or purposes 
of those in control of the former, however indicative of its 
character, have been and should be deemed the test of the right 
of the opposing belligerent to attack it at sight. In view of this 
fact the lawful presence on board the anned merchantman of neu-
tral persons or property can not give· rise to a duty towards the 
ship not otherwise apparent; · Every occupant thereof n1ust · be 
held to assume that the e1iemy will use every lawful but no 
11Iilawful means to subject the vessel to control or destroy it. 
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(c) To test the propriety of an attack at sight by the existence 
of conclusive proof of the aggressive purpose of the merchant-
ulan places an unreasonable burden on a vessel of war of an un-
protected type, whether a surface or undersea craft, for no evi-
dence of the requisite purposes of the Ine·rchantman may be 
in fact obtainable until the vessel of war encountering the 
fonner becomes itself the object of attack. The mere pursuit of 
the n1erchantman, prior to any signal 1nade to i.t, 1nay cause the 
vessel to attack the pursuN· as soon as it gets within range. 
vVhat constitutes, 1noreover, an act by way of defense 1nu~t 
always remain a matter of uncertainty. The possession of sub-
stantial armmnent encourages the possessor to assert or clahn 
that it acts defensively whenever it opens fire. Thus in practice 
the distinction between the, offensive and defensive use of· anna-
ment disappears, for the armed 1nerchantman is disposed to 
exercise its po\Yer whenever it can safely do so. To presun1e, 
therefore, that such a vessel has. a "peaceable character," on 
the supposition that it will not when occasion offers open fire 
oi1 vulnerable vessels of war of the enen1y is to ignore an infer-
ence fairly deducible fr01n the conduct of vessels equipped with 
effective n1eans of conunitting hostile acts. (2 Hyde, Inter-
national Law, p. 469.) 
British Adn1iT·a.Zty opzn~on-, 1916.-0n December 21, 
1916, Sir Ed-ward Carson, First Lord of the Ad1niralty, 
in reply to a question in the House of Co1nn1ons said : 
His l\1ajesty's Govenunent can not admit any distinction 
between the rights of unanned n1erchant ships and those anned 
for defensive purposes. It is no doubt the aim of the German 
Govern1nent to confuse defensive and offensive action with the 
object of inducing neutrals to treat defensively armed vessels 
as if they were 1nen-of-war. Our position is perfectly clear-
that a merchant sean1an enjoys the ilnme1norial right of defend-
ing his vessel against attack or visit or search by the enemy by 
any means in his power, but that he n1ust not seek out an ene1ny 
in order to attack him-that being a function reserved to conl-
missioned men-of-war. So far as I an1 aware, all neutral Po·wers, 
without exception, take the same• view, which is clearly indicatel1 
in the Prize Regulations of the Gennans then1selves. I have 
confined n1yself to stating the general position; but 1ny hon. 
Friend may rest assured that the Departments concerned are 
devoting continuous. attention to all question connected w:th 
the theory and practice of defpnsive armament. (Parlianientary 
Debates, H. C. 5 series, LXXXVIII, p. 1627.) 
94 ARMED MERCHANT VESSELS 
Netherlands position on arm.ed merohant vessels.-The 
status of armed merchant vessels in Dutch ports became 
a subject of much corr~spondence in 1914 and 1915. In 
a telegram to the British Legation at The Hague on 
August 8, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said: 
You should lose no time in explaining to Netherlands Govern-
Inent that British armed merchant vessels are armed solely for 
purposes of defence, in case they raise any question as to their 
position. Existing rules of international law grant the right of 
defence to all merchant vessels when attacked. There can be no 
right on the !)art of a neutral Government to order the internment 
of British-owneu merchant vessels, nor to require them before put-
ting to sea to land their gun8, because the, duty of such neutral 
Government to order the .immediate departure or internment of 
belligerent vessels is limited to actual and potential warships, and 
as Gre:at Britain does not admit that any Power has the right to 
convert merchant vessels into warships on the high seas, British 
merchant vessels that are in foreign ports cannot be so converted. 
As German rules permit German merchant vessels to be con-
verted on the high s.eas, we maintain o~r claim to have them in-
terned unless the neutral Government are prepared to assume re-
sponsibility for a binding assurance that no such conversion shall 
take place. (Parliamentary Papers, Misc. No. 14 [19'17], p. 1.) 
r.rhe Dutch proclamation of neutrality had prohibited 
entrance within Dutch jurisdiction of " warships of a 
belligerent and vessels of a belligerent assimilated to 
warships" and in a communication of April 7, 1915, to 
the British minister, the Netherlands Minister for For-
eign Affairs said: 
As far as Dutch territory in Europe is concerned, this rule ad-
mits of no exception, except in the case of damage or by reason 
of s,tress of weather. 
In replying to this Sir Edward Grey communicated a 
memorandum by P_rof. A. Pearce Higgins: 
As there appears to be some doubt as to the legal status of 
merchant ships which are armed in self-defence, the following 
statement may be of interest and assistance to shipowners and 
shipmasters :-
The practice of arming ships in self-defence is a very old one. 
There are· Royal Proclamations from the time of Charles I order-
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ing merchant ships to be armed, and to do their utmost to d·efend 
themselves against enemy attacks. During the Napoleonic wars 
the Prize Courts of Great Britain and the United States recog-
nised that a belligerent Iuerchant ship had a perfect right to .ar1n 
in her own defence (the Catherine Elvzabeth (British) and the 
Nere·ide (United States)). The i·ight of a belligerent Inerchant 
ship to carry arms and to resist capture is definitely and clearly 
laid down in lJoth of the cases just cited. 
Chief Justice Marshall, of the United States, in the case of the 
Neroide, said: "It is true that on her passage she had a right• to 
defend herself, and defended herself, and n1ight have captured an 
assailing vessel." 
·In Inodern tiines the right of resistance of 1nerchant vessels 
is also recognised by the United States Naval War Code, which 
was published in 1900, by the Italian Code for the M·ercantile 
:Marine, 1877, and by the Russian Prize Regulations, 1895. 
"\Vriters of weight and authority in Great Britain, the United 
States, Italy, France, Belgium, and Holland also recognise this 
right. The late Dr. F. Perels, who was at one time legal adviser 
to the German AdmiraJty, quotes with approval article 10 of 
the United States Naval War Code, which states: "The personnel 
of tnerchant vessels of an enemy, ·who in self-defence and in pro-
tection of the vessel placed in their charge resist an attack, are 
entitled to the status of prisoners of war." 
The most recent authoritative pronouncement on this sub-
ject comes from the Institute of International Law, a body com-
posed of international lawyers of all nationalities.. This learned 
society, which meets generally once a year 'in different countries 
to discuss and make proposals. on points. of International Law, at 
its meeting in 1913 at Oxford prepared a Manual of the Laws o'I 
Naval Warfare which was adopted with unanimity. Article 12 
of this Manual, which is in French, may be translated as. follows.: 
"Privateering is. forbidden. Except under the conditions 
specified in article 5 and the following articles, public and private 
ships and their crews may not take part in hostilities against 
the enemy. 
" Both are, however, a.llowed to employ force to defend th~m­
selves against tho attack of an enemy skip." 
The crews of enemy merchant ships. have for centuries been 
liable to be treated as prisoners of war whether they resisted 
capture or not. 
Crews who forcibly resist visit and capture, can not, if they 
are unsuccessful, claim to be released; they remain prisoners 
of war. 
Defensively armed merchant ships must not assume the offen-
sivp agains.t enemy merchant ships. They are armed for defence, 
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not for attack, but if they are attacked and they are able suc-
cessfully to repel the attack and even to capture their assailant, 
such capture is valid ; the captured ship is good prize as between 
the belligerents. 
There is smne authority, as in the Italian Code and Russian 
Prize Regulations, for saying that an armed merchant ship has 
a right to go to the assistance of ·other national or allied vessels 
attacked, and assist then1 in Inaking a capture. But this is 
b;y . no Inean:S such a well-established rule as the rule of self-
defence. It will in nearly all cases be 1nuch n1ore hnportant 
for a defensively armed ship to get safely away with her cargo 
than to go to the assistance of another merchant ship, for .in 
this case the safety of both may be placed in jeopardy. 
The position of the passengers on a defensively armed ship, if 
no resistance· is made, is the . same as if they were on an unarmed 
1nerchant ship. If, however, the armed ship resists, they will, 
naturally, have to take their chances of injury or death. Unless 
they take part in the resistance, they are not liable, if the ship 
is captured, to be taken prisonet·s, merely because of the fact of 
resistance having been offered· by the ship. (Ibid. p. 3.) 
vVith the. memorandunl \Vas a pamphlet by Professor 
Higgins on the sa1ne. subject. On J nly 31, 1915, M. Lou-
don, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied: 
In his note of the· 12th June last Mr. Chilton returned to this 
subject. [Admission of arn1ed 1nerchant vessels.] He specially 
called 1ny attention to· the· rule of international law which per1nits 
bellige-rent merchant vessels to defend the·mselves against enemy 
warships, and. he was good ·enough to add to his note· a n1emoran-
dun1 and a pamphlet in support- of his observations. 
I have read these documents with 1nuch interest. However, 
there see1ns to n1e to be no connection between the· above-mentioned 
rule and the· que·stion 'vhether the acbnission into neutral ports of 
a certain category of vessels of belligerent nationality is or is not 
co1npatible with the observance of a strict neutrality. This l-atter 
question lies within the proYince: of the law· of neutrality. On 
the other hand, the rule inYo,kec1 by 31r. Chilton is part of the law 
of war. 
A belligerent 1nerchant ve·ssel 'vhich fights to escape· capture or 
destruction by an enen1y 'varship conuuits an act the· legitin1aey 
of which is indeed unquestionable, but which is none the less an 
act of war. (Ibid. p. 5.) 
The British Govern1nent dissented fron1 this vie\Y and 
rnade an elaborate argtunent against the ~ether lands po-
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sition involving state1nents of certain consequences that 
might follovv. 1\!Iany notes \Yere exchanged, but the 
Nether lands n1aintained the right to exclude arine(l mer-
chant vessels. · 
Offlc'l·az state?nents.-Governiuents of different States 
Inacle kno\vn their attitude upon ar1ned 1nerchant vessels 
during the ''r oriel ''T~u-. usually by do1nestic regulations 
and so1netin1es in a 1nore :fonnal Inanner. 'There \Vas 
Inuch diversity and indefiniteness in the3e docu1nents. 
The Argentine Republic took action e·ai·ly in the \\r orld 
Y\Tar, August 16, 19t-t forbidding foreign Inerchant ves-
sels to arm as auxiliary vessels o:f \Var and requiring such 
merchant yessels as \vere in port to declare \Vithjn 24 
hours if having auxiliary statns. These \vere to be · 
treated as Yessels of ·war. 
General Orders No. 133 of the Argentine navy depart-
rnent, _A_ugust 17, 1914~ provided: 
(c) Foreign 1nerchanbnen ·which \Vithout being officially de-
clared as auxiliary cruiser~ neYertheless carry cannon for their 
defense shall not 1nake use of the1n in waters under State, con-
trol, and the, Govennnent reserves to itself in case of their having 
served as auxiliary cruisers the right to treat them as such when 
they return to waters under its jurisdiction. 
As the, legal status of ships of war is not conceded these ves-
sels, any hostile act of theirs in \Vaters under the jurisdiction of 
the State shall be considered as an act in open violation of the 
law of the country. 
(d) The general prefecture ef ports shall take note of all 
foreign merchanhnen which 1na.:r have cannon for defense, either 
1nounted or unn1ounted. or en1placements for cannon, to the end 
that they be e·specially watched. 
(e) Anwng the foreign 1nerchanhnen armed with cannon there 
are some that carry their cannon on the stern only, and with a 
very restricted firing sector; in other words, they are guns which 
1nay fire only directly astern. It 1nay well be conceded that tha 
sole object of these guns is the defense of the boat. Other vessels 
carry then1 in the bow and on both sides-that is to say, in 
offensive sectors. EYen though the technical requisites for con-
sidering these boat$ as auxiliary cruisers do not appear, it is 
nevertheless eYident that ~heir armament suggests their purpose. 
l-Ienee supervision in sueh cases ~hall be especially rigorous. 
98 ARMED MERCHANT VES~ELS 
(f) It is to be borne in mind that by virtue of the prov1s10ns 
of article 31 in the r'egula tions of the port of the capital and of 
La Plata no boat is to enter them with explosives aboard. Con-
sequently if any merchantmen armed with cannon carry powder 
on board they are not to be per1nitted to enter the harbor before 
disembarking a1nm uni tions . 
. (g) The general prefecture of ports vdll take necessary Ineas-
nres to prevent the der1arture of war vessels, auxiliary cruisers, 
or even armed 1nerchanhnen until 24 hours after the departure 
from the sanw harbor of any other armed or unannecl 1nerchant-
1nan flying the flag of a hostile country. 
(h) 'Var vessels and ftuxiliary cruisers flying belligerent colors 
whose stop in territorial waters is lhnited to 24 hours shall not 
cast anchor in the1n except for reasons of exceptional urgency 
( caso de fuerza mayor) . 
Armed 1nerchantmen wh!ch it is suspected may be conve~ted 
into auxiliary cruisers shall be watched with particular care, 
so that they 1nay not be able to thwart the precautions estab-
lished for the protection of steamers departing each in the order 
of its turn by casting anchor with hostile intent within the 
t erritorial waters. (1917 N. W. C. Int. Law Docs. p. 23.) 
The Chilean rules of August 14, 1914, issued by the 
Mi?-ister of Foreign Relations, provided that: 
1. All vessels at anchor in Chilean ports or which navigate 
in the national territorial waters may be obliged to submit to . 
the inspection of their papers by the Chilean authorities, which 
1nay, whenever they deem it necessary, according to the rules 
which are hereafter specified, proceed anew to the inspection of 
the vessel, of its passengers, of its cargo, and of its documents. 
In consequence, the clearance of any vessel can not be authorized, 
whatever its cargo and whatever •its destination, until the ship has 
presented complete manifests. 
2. Permission to depart will be given to no merchant vessel 
which has altered or tried to alter its . status, if there is reason 
to believe that the vessel has intended to transform itself into 
an auxiliary cruiser or an arn1ed vessel in any degree whatso-
ever. 
The following acts will be considered as furnishing a presump-
tion of change of status: 
(a) To alter the location or position of guns which are on board 
the vessel at the time of its arrival; to change the color, the rig-
ging, or the equipment of the vessel in a 1nanner to create a 
presumption that this change has an object relating to n1ilitary 
operations ; 
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(b) To embark guns, arms, or munitions in the circumstances 
which indicate adaptation of the vessel to military ends; 
(c) To refuse to take on board passengers when the vessel 
possesses suitable accommodation for them ; 
(d) To load abnormal quantities of coal. 
3. The maritime authorities should demand of foreign consuls 
who vise the papers of vessels a declaration in reference to the 
chara.cter of the vessel, stating whether it is a question of a mer-
chant vessel engaged in the transport of merchandise and pa-ssen-
gers, or whether it forms a part of the armed forces of the nation 
to which it belongs. In this latter case the vessel will be warned 
that it must depart after twenty-four hours and with coal only 
sufficient for the journey to the nearest port of its nation. (1916 
N. W. C. Int. Law Topics, p. 16.) 
In publishing these rules the. Minister of Foreign 
Affairs stated " The Government of the United States 
has issued similar r'egulations." 
·A note :from the same office on March 15, 1915, involves 
some further propositions which were due to the British 
query as to whether auxiliary naval vessels might resume 
their merchant-vessel status. · 
The Government of Chile desires to settle the question sug-
gested by the note above indicated according to the attitude 
of strict neutrality adopted by it since the beginning of the war 
and also in conforn1ity with the general convenience of the 
American Continent, since the great European conflict has 
demonstrated in an evident manner that the international rules 
should in the future take into consideration the particular 
conditions of this hemisphere. 
Inspired by this idea, the Chilean Government sees no incon-
venience in admitting into the ports and jurisdictional waters 
of Chile and in treating in all respects as merchant vessels, ves-
sels which have been auxiliaries of the fleet of one of the belliger-
ent States, when the said vessels fulfill the following conditions: 
1. That. the auxiliary vessel has not violated Chilean neu-
trality; 
2. That the reconversion took place in the ports or jurisdic-
tional :waters of the country to which the vessel belongs or in 
the ports of' its allies ; 
3. That this was effective: that is to say, that the vessel 
neither in its crew· nor in its equip1nent gives evidence . that it 
can be of service to the armed fleet of its country in the capacity 
of an auxiliary, as it was formerly; 
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4. That the Government of the country to which the vessel 
belongs communicates to all interested nations, and in particular 
to neutrals, the na1nes of auxiliary vessels which have lost this 
status to restune that of merchant vessels; and 
·5. That the sa1ne Govern1nent give its word that the said ves-
sels are not in the future intended for the service of the armed 
fleet hi ?the capacity of auxiliaries; (Ibid. p. 28.) 
L-ater another communication states: 
The Chilean ports will receive 1nerchant vessels armed for 
defense when the respective Govenunents previously communicate 
to us the name of the vessel which travels under these conditions 
and also the route, roll of crew, list of passengers, and cargo, 
as well as the manage1nent and the arinainent of the vessel, 
de1nonstrating that it is in reality a question of a merchant ves-
sel which is not intended to carry on hostile acts nor to cooperate 
r 
in the 'varlike operations of' ene1ny fleets. 
If an armed 1nerch~nt vessel arrives without this previous 
notice of the Governn1ent, it will be considered and treated as 
.suspicious. If, violating their· declaration, these vessels engage in 
operations of war against other 1nerchant vessels without defense 
the;r will be forthwith considered and tr~ated as pirates, since the 
Governn1ent of the country under whose flag they fly will have 
fol'lnally declared their exclusively com1nercial character by not 
incorporating then1 into its fleet of 'var. (Ibid. p. 31.) 
Cuba, March 3, 1916, reproduced as a statement of its 
policy the men1orandum issued by the United States Sep-
tember 19, 1914 (ante, p. 83). 
There "\Vere differences in the regulations issued by 
other countries. The methods of determining ·whether 
an armed merchant vessel was to be treated as a vessel 
of war or as a merchant vessel also varied at different 
times in some states. There were also interpretations 
which led to misunderstandings. Some, of these indicated 
that it was as Mr. Churchill had predicted in 1913, "a 
period of retrogression." 
British emplan{J)tion, 1917.-That British armed mer-
chant vessels would be liable in ports of the United States 
under some of the principles set forth in the meino-
randum of March 25, 1916, is evident from the state1nents 
of Sir Ed,vard Carson and J\fr. Churchill in 1917. 
BRI,TISH STATEMENTS, 191 7 101 
~1r. 'Vinston Churchill, speaking on February 2, 1917, 
before the House of Commons, said : 
The object of putting guns on a tnerchant ship is to ccnnpel 
the sub1narine to sub1nerge. If a tnerchant ship has no guns, a 
submarine with a gun is able to destroy it at leisure by gunfire, 
and we must remen1ber that on the surface subn1arines go nearly 
twice as fast as they do under ·water. Therefore, the effect of 
putting guns on a n1erchant ship is to drive the sub1narine to-
abandon the use of the gun, to lose its surface speed, and to fall 
back on the n1uch slower speed under water and the use of the 
torpedo. The torpedo, c01npared with the gun, is a weapon of 
much n1ore lilnited application. The number of torpedoes which 
can be constructed in a given time is itself subject to certain 
lhnits. Any trained artillerist or naval gunner can hit 'vith a 
gun, but to 1nake a subn1erged attack with a torpedo requires a 
1nuch higher degree of skill and training. One of the things we 
counted on to check the indefinite developn1ent of Gern1an sub-
lnarine expansion was the difficulty of training crews. That 
difficulty does not manifest itself as long as sub1narines are free to 
USe the gun. but it Will Undoubtedly 111anifest itself When they are 
driven back on the aln1ost exclusive use of the torpedo, by the fact 
that the great 1najority of 1nerchant ships which they 1neet will 
be effectively annell, and the result will be, or should be to a cer-
tain extent. that a very large proportion of torpedoes will be 
wasted, because the difficulty of firing at a ship advancing with 
accuracy is very great, and there is only a Yery limited arc 
ahead of a ship fron1 which a torpedo can be discharged ·with 
the certainty of getting hmne. Also the torpedo is easy to dodge, 
and a shell is hnpossible to dodge. I thought it ·was right to ex-
plain in a fe·w simple words this 1natter which is bread and butter 
to every family in this country. It is of the highest ilnportance 
that the ships which are being built to replace existing tonnage! 
·what ·we might call tonnage casualties, should possess a speed 
superior to the speed of an ene1ny sub1narine sub1nerged. (Par-
liainentary Debates, 5 s., H. C., XC, p. 1380.) 
The parliarnentary seeretnr_v to the Ministry of Ship-
ping Control indicated his assent and Mr. Churchill 
continued: 
I an1 very glad 1ny hon. Ifrieud assents to that, because it is 
of t11e utmost importnnee that the Ad1niralty's view on a ,matter 
of that kind should bJ fully rPalised and adopted by the Depart-
ment of Shipping Coutrol. Anothee poiut, ·which is of gl'eat 
importance, is that not only :-;hould guns be 11ut on the ships, but 
there should he at lC'ast one good gun-layPr on earh. I dare sny 
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that is becoming the case now, but it was not the case until a 
short time ago, and many cases have been brought to notice of 
vessels which carried guns but carried no man really competent 
to direct the shot to its objective. (Ibid. p. 1381.) 
While under the guise o£ retaliation a belligerent might 
arm and use its merchant vessels £or any purpose ,it saw fit 
as regards its enemy, such appeal to the principle o£ 
retaliation would give these ve~sels no special rights in 
neutral ports. 
German war-zone note, January 31, 1917.-A:fter an ex-
planatory statement the German ambassador presented to 
the United States a memorandum on January 31, 1917, 
recounting what Germany conceived to be disregard by 
the Allies o:f rules o£ international law and stating that: 
Under these circumstances Germany will meet the illegal meas-
ures of her enemies by forcibly preventing after February 1, 1917, 
in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the Eastern 
Mediterranean all navigation, that of n~utrals included, from and 
to England and from and to France, etc. etc. All ships met within 
that zone will be sunk. (Spec. Sup. Am. Jour. Int~ Law, vol.11, 
1917, p. 333.) 
Breaking of diplomatic relations, Februarry 3, 1917.-
In reply the Secretary o:f State reviewed the prior action 
of Germany and the promises which the United States 
understood had been made in regard to the conduct o:f 
submarine warfare and concluded: 
In view of this declaration, which withdraws suddenly and 
without prior intimation the solemn assurances given in the 
Imperial Government's note of May 4, 1916, this Government has 
no alternative consistent with the dignity and honor of the 
United States but to take the course which it explicitly an-
nounced in its note of April 18, 1916, it would take in the 
event that the Imperial Government did not declare and effect 
an abandonment of the methods of submarine warfare then em-
ployed and to which the Imperial Government now purpose 
again to resort. 
The President has, therefore, directed me to announce to Your 
Excellency that all diplomatic relations between the United States 
:and the German Empire are severed, and that the American ain-
bassador .at Berlin will be immediately withdrawn, and in accord-
ance with such announcement to deliver to Your Excellency your 
passports. (Ibid. p. 337.) 
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.r1 merioan attituck afte?~ breaking diplomatic rela-
tions.-On February 3, 1917, the President explained in 
an address to Congress the reasons for the breaking of 
diplomatic relations with Germany. Negotiations were 
continued through the Swiss minister. 
A bill was introduced, February 27, 1917, to authorize 
the President to provide for the arming of f\.-merican 
merchant vessels "with defensive arms fore and aft, and 
also with the necessary ammunition and means of mak-
ing use of them." On March 12 announcement was made 
to the diplomatic representatives in Washington that the 
Government had "determined to place upon all Ameri-
can merchant vessels sailing through the barred areas an 
armed guard for the protection of the vessels and the 
lives of the persons on board." (Ibid. p. 345.) 
After February 27 the United States also admitted to its 
ports vessels of the allied. belligerents armed fore and aft. 
Other neutral problems.-The neutral may find diffi-
culty in determining many questions i£ armed merchant 
vessels are to be allowed. Such means of determination 
as were accepted in the vVorld War are without general 
sanction. I-Iow far might a neutral without liability 
allo'v an armed merchant vessel under the merchant flag 
of a belligerent state to take .on war supplies, mal~e re-
pairs, etc., when that state advocates conversion and 
reconversion on the high seas without limitation? 
Article XIV of the treaty limiting naval armament, 
February 6, 1922, is as follows: 
No preparations shall be made in rnerchant ships in time· of 
peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose 
of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the· neces-
sary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not e·xceeding 
6 inch ( 152 millimetres) calibre. 
There might be under terms of this situation vessels 
adapted in accordance with Article XIV. Article XIV 
has been thought by some to be a tacit sanction for the 
arming of merchant vessels, but it should be observed 
that this article provides in time of peace for strengthen-
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ing decks "for fhe purpose of conyerting such ships into 
vessels of 'var " and that no other preparations for this 
purpose shall be made. · It is apparently assu1necl that in 
ti1ne of 'var Inerchant vessels ~Yfill be converted and that 
in time of peace decks 'vill be stiffened for that purpose. 
If in ti1ne of peace a 1nerchant vessel has had its 
decks stiffened and after the outbreak of 'var' carries 
guns not exceeding 6-inch caliber, can it claim to be a 
1nerchant vessel ar1necl only for de.fense. or 'vould any 
arma1nent on such a Yessel put it in the class of a ·war 
vessel? ~1ay it be 1naintained that the stiffening of 
decks 'vas not for the purpose of conversion into vessels 
of war but for installing- guns for defense :? 
The 'vording of Article XI\T does not neeessarily pre-
clude such an interpretation as the latter, and the French 
translation~ 'vhich is eqnally official, 'vould possibly per-
n1it such an interpretation. 
r_rhe opposing belligerent lliight~ ho,yeyer, Inaintain 
that deck strengthening in tin1e of peace 'vas for the pur-
pose of converting the vessel into a vessel of ,.rar, and that 
therefore the n1ounting of a gnn of any caliber on such a 
vessel "~as a. fulfilhnent of the purpose 1naking the vessel 
a: ves~el of 'var so far as belligerent relations 'vere con-
eerned. A neutraln1ight n1aintain the san1e position. 
Probably the very Yc~se>ls \rhich n1ight have had 
deck strengthening 'vonl<l be the ve3sels 'vhich, reinain-
ing in the 1nerchant ser\~ice, 'vonld arn1 for defense, and 
it thns anned 'voulct nndc)r the belligerent ene1ny's in-
tr.rpretation, becon1e liable as yessels of 'var. The argu-
ITient 'vould be briefly that strengthening decks is to 
pre pare for conversio11 into a vessel of 'var. Putting 
guns on board is evidence of conversion; therefore a ves-
sel having guns on decks stiffened in , tin1e of peace' is a 
v·essel of 'var. The belligerent can not take the chance 
of being sunk while 1naking an investigation to fi1Hl ont 
"\vhether such a vessel has been legally converted into a 
vessel of war in a home port in accord 'vith the rules of 
n Hague convention. 
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'!''he granting of subsidies and special franchises , the 
provisions for taking over into public service in titne of 
'Yar, and other state acts con1.plicate the .. establishing of 
a "\vell-definecl basis for neutral jndg1nent of the status 
of merchant vessels in "\var tin1e. 'rhe public o'vnersh]p 
of 1nerchant vessels 'vith varying degrees of public 
control adds fnrt her difficulties. 
C'onclusion.-'l''here have been 'vide differences of 
opinion and practice in regard to the treahnent of ar1necl 
1nerchant vessels. 
It can not be said that there is now agreement as to the laws 
in regard to ar1necl n1erchan t vessels, but under Inodern conditions 
the ancient reascms for arming do not exist, as piracy and 
sea thieYing of early clays no longer exist. Anning Inight be 
to Ineet a merchant vessel of the enemy similarly annecl, as was 
the British contentiou just before and iu the early part of the 
'Yorld 'Yar. Soon, ho\YeYer, it was apparent fron1 documents 
and practice that an armed merchant yessel's n1aster would use 
his arms against what he n1ight consider an inferior Yessel. For 
:-;afety of 11ersonnt'l and pro11erty, a n1erchaut yessel should 
rt:·nutin a peaceful ye~sel. A yessel of war should likewise 
conduct .itself in accord \Yith the rules of \Yar, and should not be 
put in 11eril by Ye~:-;els \Ylwse immunity and right to safety it 
is under obligation to respect. ('Yilson, IIandbook of Interna-
tional Law, 2cl eel .. p. 30G.) 
I.Jate state practice in o'vning and .operating 1nore or 
less directly son1e of the 1nerchant 1narine under its flag 
\'i'"oulcl seen1 to 1nake scnne of the early op~nions scarcely 
.applicable to present conditions. These and 1nany other 
reasons point to the desirability both :for beHigerents and 
neutl'als of a clear detern1ination of the status o:f anned 
Inerchant vessels in the ti1ne of 'var. 
SOLUTION 
Practice and opinion since 1914 afford son1e support 
for the position of each neutral and for the protest of 
each belligerent, but .the position of state C seen1s to be 
ga1n1ng support. 'rhe 'vhole sit11ation sho,vs the, need 
of clear deter1nina ti on of the status of ar1ned 1nerchnnt 
Ycssels. 
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